ABSTRACT
this Directive is to regulate and harmonise the interaction of public and private enforcement of competition law within Europe, particularly with regard to disclosure of leniency materials, quantification of damages and availability of defences. In this paper, I explore the tension created by the interaction of public and private enforcement and associated leniency programmes in the European regime with the view of assessing the efficacy of the proposed Directive. My thesis is that while the judgement in Pfleiderer, by refusing to recognise or establish a hierarchy between public and private enforcement goals, has opened difficulties with disclosure of leniency materials, the Proposed Directive goes part of the way to resolve these difficulties. However a more complete resolution of these difficulties would necessitate a legislative programme that would contain elements which may be steps too far at this time.
This paper is structured as follows. At the outset, I will present a model of a cartel control system, indicating its features and their interactions. The model will be illuminated by comparisons with the US system, which through evolution has developed into a very sophisticated regime, and is used as a paradigm for other jurisdictions to adopt.
8 I next turn to concerns found in the private enforcement of competition law (particularly regarding the redress of damages), identifying those concerns which are exacerbated by leniency programmes. I then turn to the recent court activity at the EU and Member State level to show the tensions found in the European regime. In the final section of the paper I assess the European legislators' efforts at making the EU's regime more workable.
Features of a Cartel Control System
The objective of a public cartel control system is to provide an ex ante deterrent against economic collusion. An ideal public programme sets the expected costs of participating in a cartel to be greater than the benefits; consequently a rational actor will avoid such activity. 9 In one model, public enforcement consists mainly of pecuniary sanctions directed at firms or undertakings who engage in such activity. In the other model, A private enforcement procedure, on the other hand, serves to compensate ex post those who have been harmed by that activity; by permitting those harmed a means of compensation for their losses. Private enforcement, in the context of the EU, acts not merely to vindicate an affected individual's right to damages for infringement of competition law 10 but also to provide some supplementary deterrence to the public enforcement regime. Such a supplement is effective in situations where, for instance, work-load prioritisation concerns preclude the public authority's investigation and prosecution of an alleged infringement; or those cases where the evidence obtained during an investigation is insufficient to prove the infringement at a criminal standard, but will nonetheless support its proof at a lesser, civil, standard.
Private enforcement in the American context, acts as an alternative deterrent: some 90 per cent of antitrust matters are privately litigated. 11 A significant reason for this deterrent effect lies in the availability of treble damages. From a Beckerian perspective, 12 an act is deterred only if the expected costs of engaging in the act are outweighed by its expected benefits. Where the probability of detection of the act is less than 1 (as it will be in any "real world" public or private enforcement regime), the sanction imposed must be greater than the offender's gain (e.g. as measured by damages). This logic applies whether the enforcement regime (and the standard of proof) is civil or criminal. The treble damages element provided for by the Sherman Act gives the necessary uplift required to alter the American system from a compensatory regime to an effective deterrent.
Further, it may be possible to adjust incentives in private litigation to encourage the detection of cartel activity, thereby uncovering infringements which may not have come to 10 12 See Becker (n 9) the authorities' attention. 13 One can view the fees earned by successful plaintiff's counsel in class action anti-trust litigation as a means of rewarding the private investigation and prosecution of such activity. As a point of illustration, it is useful to note that among the original intentions in the minds of the framers of the US Sherman and Clayton Acts was to make the availability of private remedies more generally accessible, so as to serve as an incentive for "Private Attorneys General," to supplement the enforcement efforts of public authorities.
14 Leniency (and whistle-blowing 15 ) programmes are designed to engineer the acquisition of information about cartel activity. 16 Typically such programmes grant full amnesty to the first to inform (subject to varying conditions), with reductions in sanctions potentially available to others who provide information, should the information be of sufficient value and/or other conditions are met. The effectiveness of such programmes in uncovering cartel activity is widely touted.
Discussing the US experience, Scott Hammond noted:
The Antitrust Division has spent the last two decades building and implementing a "carrot and stick" enforcement strategy by coupling rewards for voluntary disclosure and timely cooperation pursuant to the Antitrust Division's Corporate Leniency Program with severe sanctions. In addition, the Antitrust Division utilizes all available investigatory tools to create a significant risk and fear of detection and prosecution for violators of U.S. antitrust laws. The seeds of this "carrot and stick" enforcement strategy were planted by the Antitrust Division in the mid1990s and began to bear fruit over the next decade. … . . .
The single most significant development in cartel enforcement is the proliferation of effective leniency programs. The advent of leniency programs has completely transformed the way competition authorities around the world detect, investigate, and deter cartels. Cartels by their nature are secretive and, therefore, hard to detect. Leniency programs provide enforcers with an investigative tool to uncover cartels that may have otherwise gone undetected and continued to harm consumers.
While the notion of letting hard core cartel participants escape punishment was initially unsettling to many prosecutors, the Antitrust Division recognized that the grant of full immunity was necessary to induce cartel participants to turn on each other and self-report, resulting in the discovery and termination of the conduct, the successful prosecution of the remaining cartel participants, and damage recovery for victims. Moreover, the hope was that the benefits of leniency would extend beyond the cartels it directly uncovered and that the very existence of the leniency policy would be viewed by executives as raising the risk of detection and punishment, leading to greater deterrence of cartel activity. Many take this decision as a response to external events; for instance, when investigations in one sector make the company look into its other lines of business.
Other immunity applications are triggered by internal events; for instance, when a company has a new CEO or is acquired by another company and the cartel is uncovered in the due diligence exercise; or when an employee blows the whistle.
Immunity and reductions help companies comply with our rules because they raise the risk of being exposed by the other members of the cartel.
And we know that -apart from the level of sanctions -deterrence depends on the likelihood that the illegal behaviour is discovered and punished.
Although the cooperation of companies is very important, we also investigate cartel cases ex officio; as a matter of fact, a quarter of our decisions are initiated without a request for immunity.
In these cases too, we motivate companies with lower fines if they decide to cooperate with the investigation -and many of them do. However, by imposing individual liability for such activity, the American system readjusts the incentives. Agents, if convicted have to bear the costs of this activity. Prison sentences cannot be off-loaded, or indemnified, in the way that fines can be. Thus individual sanctions can further exploit the instability contained in cartel activity by not only pitting the interests of one firm against another, but also by pitting the interests of the agents against those of the firm.
Private Enforcement
The European courts have recognised the importance of private damages in contributing to the maintenance of the European competition regime. The well-known recognition of this is found in Courage and Crehan:
As regards the possibility of seeking compensation for loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition, it should be remembered from the outset that, in accordance with settled case-law, the national courts whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction must ensure that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer on individuals … .
The full effectiveness of Article 85 of the Treaty and, in particular, the practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.
Indeed, the existence of such a right strengthens the working of the Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. From that point of view, actions for damages before the national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the Community.
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28 Courage and Crehan (n 10) at paras 25 -27
However, to effectively redress harms done, Plaintiffs (or their counsel) must obtain information to accurately quantify the harm done by the cartel activity. The mere existence of cartel activity is insufficient to prove damages.
Proving damages in cartel claims is different from proof of damages in other financial matters. In a breach of contract claim, where-say a seller refused to deliver the goods as and when promised-one need only look at difference in the contract price and the market price to accurately quantify the damages. In cartel matters, this quantification is different, as it is the market price which is the very focus of the inquiry. Accordingly, one needs to engage in a hypothetical (and thus more difficult) inquiry to determine what the market price would have been but for the cartel activity. Likewise, issues of causation are germane, as mere participation in a cartel is insufficient on its own to establish the quantum of loss caused by participation.
The information which can be useful to construct the hypothetical market is in the hands of the cartel members and is not readily accessible from other sources. This 
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In addition to its utility to Plaintiffs' counsel, this information is absolutely essential to public authorities in their investigation of this activity, and is often contained in leniency applications or in clarifications of leniency application materials. Given the cloak of secrecy used by cartels, interpreting cryptic documents and other intentionally opaque communication among cartel members to establish what they mean is essential for determining the scope, duration and economic consequences of the infringement.
Accordingly the existence of this information identifies a number of needs within the cartel control system. There is the need of the authorities to receive this information to prosecute cartel activities, and the resulting need of leniency applicants to provide the information to benefit from the programmes. There is also the need of Plaintiffs' counsel to obtain this information to successfully prosecute their clients' private actions, and a corresponding need for leniency applicants not to have this information disclosed, so as not to increase their exposure to claims.
Pfleiderer and the EU's Difficulty
The crux of the difficulty is simply this: by applying for leniency, the applicant (though almost certainly obtaining a savings on any fine) opens itself to greater exposure for civil liability, should the content of the leniency application find its way into the hands of the Plaintiffs' Bar. The concerns are well expressed in the opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Pflederer, who noted:
In my view, in such circumstances the disclosure by a national competition authority of all the information and documents submitted to it by a leniency applicant could seriously undermine the attractiveness and thus the effectiveness of that authority's leniency programme as potential leniency applicants may perceive that they will find themselves in a less favourable position in actions for civil damages, due to the self-incriminating statements and evidence which they are required to present to the authority, than the other cartel members which do not apply for leniency. Thus while a potential leniency applicant may benefit from immunity from or a reduction in fines, that benefit may be perceived as being outweighed by an increased risk of liability for damages where access to the leniency file is granted, particularly in cases where cartel members are jointly and severally liable under national rules of civil procedure. A cartel member may therefore abstain from applying for leniency altogether or alternatively be less forthcoming with a competition authority during the leniency procedure.
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The possibility that leniency materials might be disclosed to Plaintiffs' counsel serves as a disincentive to apply for leniency, or if leniency is applied for, to be less than forthright with the authorities in providing information to them.
There are two obvious means of obtaining the information contained in a leniency application: obtaining the material from the competition authority which investigated the cartel (and subsequently granted leniency) or by obtaining in jurisdictions which permit discovery of opposing litigants, obtaining the information from the defendant as part of the discovery process. By discovering a Defendant in this way, a Plaintiff is likely to obtain the same information (if not copies of the same documents) which is found in the competition authority's files. The former means was considered by the ECJ in Pfliederer, the latter by the English High Court in NGET.
a. Pfliederer: Disclosure of the Agency's File
Pfleiderer involved a decorating paper cartel, of which Pfleiderer was a customer.
During the cartel's duration, it had purchased over €60 million worth of goods from the undertakings involved. 31 To prepare its action for damages, Pfleiderer sought access to the leniency file held by the Bundeskartellamt (BKA) which had earlier fined the cartel participants. 32 The BKA granted partial access to the file, "sending three decisions imposing fines, from which identifying information had been removed, and a list of the evidence 30 Pfleiderer (n 1) Opinion of the AG para 38 31 Pfleiderer (n 1) Judgement para 10 32 Ibid paras 11 -12 recorded as having been obtained during the search." 33 Pfleider renewed its request, 34 but ultimately made an application to the Amtsgericht Bonn for access to the entire file. The
Amtsgericht provisionally granted access to the entire file, but stayed its decision pending a reference to the ECJ.
Although the Court was aware of the disincentives resulting from the disclosure of leniency applications, its reasoning for rejecting blanket non-disclosure for the leniency application (or even for specific elements of the leniency application), the Court's reasoning was somewhat perfunctory. The judgment recognised the recognised the role of leniency programmes in public enforcement, and noted that they "are useful tools if efforts to uncover and bring to an end infringements of competition rules are to be effective and serve, therefore, the objective of effective application of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU." 35 As such the Court conceded:
… The effectiveness of those programmes could, however, be compromised if documents relating to a leniency procedure were disclosed to persons wishing to bring an action for damages, even if the national competition authorities were to grant to the applicant for leniency exemption, in whole or in part, from the fine which they could have imposed.
The view can reasonably be taken that a person involved in an infringement of competition law, faced with the possibility of such disclosure, would be deterred from taking the opportunity offered by such leniency programmes, particularly when, Accordingly, in the consideration of an application for access to documents relating to a leniency programme submitted by a person who is seeking to obtain damages from another person who has taken advantage of such a leniency programme, it is necessary to ensure that the applicable national rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic claims and that they do not operate in such a way as to make it practically impossible or excessively difficult to obtain such compensation (see, to that effect, Courage and Crehan, paragraph 29) and to weigh the respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour of the protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency.
That weighing exercise can be conducted by the national courts and tribunals only on a case-by-case basis, according to national law, and taking into account all the relevant factors in the case.
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As a result, the Court concluded:
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that the provisions of European Union law on cartels, and in In arriving at its conclusion, the Court made no apparent attempt to weigh public enforcement goals (ex ante deterrence) against the goals of private enforcement (i.e. an effective remedy and "a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in the European Union"), and merely stated that disclosure was a matter for national courts under national law with the standard "no less favourable conditions" proviso.
While the Court's reasoning may have been perfunctory, it contained few surprises.
In the absence of Regulations or harmonising Directives to the contrary, determination of damages is a matter for the Courts of Member States under national law (which also includes national civil procedure rules) and disclosure rules are part of such law. The only potential surprise was the requirement that national courts engage in the weighing exercise on a "caseby-case basis," thereby casting doubt on the ability of courts or national legislatures to exempt certain classes of documents from disclosure. Rather, the relevant factor for English Courts to consider regarding the disclosure of leniency files is proportionality.
Mr Justice Roth reasoned:
The Commission also submits that a relevant factor is whether the disclosure sought is proportionate, having regard to the potentially adverse effect of disclosure on leniency programmes. I agree, and indeed proportionality is in any event a consideration in applying the English rules on disclosure and inspection: CPR rule 31.3(2) and PD 31A, para 2. Here, because of the balancing exercise proportionality assumes particular significance in a different context from reference to the size of the 42 NGET (n 6) para 32 43 Ibid para 34 claim and the amount of work involved. In my judgment, proportionality should be considered in terms of (a) whether the information is available from other sources, and (b) the relevance of the leniency materials to the issues in this case.
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In ordering disclosure, the Court noted that the cartel was sophisticated, operated with regular meetings and kept cryptic records, which would require assistance in interpretation. Since the Defendants were unlikely to provide NGET with statements interpreting these documents, there was no substitute for the information contained in the leniency application. 45 As Roth J concluded, "Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, to the extent that the information in the disclosure sought is of real assistance, I do not consider that other means are available, at least not without excessive difficulty, for NGET to derive that information." 46 Similarly, in EnBW the General Court (GC) was called upon to determine the Commission's duty of disclosure of their file in the same cartel as was the concern in NGET. In practice this allows for systematic objections to any request for access, inter alia when the requests pertains to documents the disclosure of which is contrary to the interests of the parties to the proceedings, including documents which may contain evidence on which a claim for compensation could be based and which the requesting party cannot obtain by other means.
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While the ECJ noted that in the absence of EU rules on point, it is up to member states to develop their legal provisions but in so doing they must ensure the protection and vindication of legal rights granted under European law.
The Court recognised that a rule (such as the Austrian rule) which precluded any access to the file would make the vindication of a claimant's right of private damages difficult, if not impossible. 55 Likewise, a rule of routine, general disclosure of the file is also inappropriate as such a rule may lead to infringements of other European legal rights of the parties (e. g. privacy, protection of business secrets) and thus possibly the willingness of cartel members to take advantage of leniency programmes. 56 Accordingly, disclosure must be "conducted by the national courts and tribunals only on a case-by-case basis, according to national law, and taking into account all the relevant factors in the case… ."
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In applying these principles to disclosure of materials contained in leniency files, the ECJ's reasoning emphasises the need to balance considerations of the public interest in having effective leniency programmes against individuals' rights to effectively pursue actions for damages. While leaving the case-by-case balancing in the hands of the national courts, the ECJ made the following observation:
In particular, as regards the public interest of having effective leniency programmes … the argument that there is a risk that access to evidence contained in a file in competition proceedings which is necessary as a basis for those actions may undermine the effectiveness of a leniency programme in which those documents were disclosed to the competent competition authority cannot justify a refusal to grant access to that evidence. While a case-by-case and document-by-document approach is necessary to ensure all parties' legal rights are respected, documents which risk undermining the efficacy of a leniency programme may be withheld from prospective claimants. It will be interesting to see how widely or narrowly this last point will be construed in the future.
The principles elicited in Pfliederer and its progeny and the subsequent application of these principles by the German and English courts have made a mess out of the EU's leniency programme. The main difficulty is that the ECJ avoided the problem by, in effect, kicking the ball to the Member States and their national courts. The consequences of this are to balkanise the standards by which leniency applications are kept confidential, and do so with retrospective effect. While the Amtsgericht's and the High Court's decisions add a little clarity to German and English law, the ECJ's requirement that disclosure obligations are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis makes muddies the waters somewhat. Further, though these two member states have clarified disclosure criteria, there are over two dozen more jurisdictions which need to make a similar determination. The consequence of this difficulty can be expressed in one word: uncertainty.
After Pfleiderer, a prospective leniency applicant cannot know which (if any) documents contained in an application will remain out of the hands of prospective Plaintiffs.
As such the prospective applicant is unable to accurately assess its exposure, and thus determine the benefits of applying for leniency. This will be a concern for a prospective leniency applicant, as the rough precision demanded for accurate "playing" of the Prisoner's Dilemma games which are leniency programmes is simply no longer present. 58 Ibid paras 46 -48
Harmonising Leniency and Private Enforcement
At this juncture, we make some observations regarding the prospective leniency applicant's concern. The immediate fear of a leniency applicant is that the applicant will somehow be required to "pay more" as a result of its application (and the possible release of the information contained in the application). There are numerous ways this can occur, some or all of which may be relevant in any given case. These include: In addressing these concerns we must re-remind ourselves that although private enforcement complements public enforcement, and in spite of protestations to the contrary, 60 enhancements to one regime may likely have an effect on the other regime. Accordingly, when enhancements need to be made, we must keep the relative hierarchy between public and private enforcement in mind.
To this end, we must consider two distinct In the author's mind, this is as it should be. The emphasis in antitrust enforcement should be focused on effective public enforcement, based on the recognition that public enforcement has a deterrent effect, seeking to prevent the occurrence of conduct before it has a chance to do harm. This is in contrast to the reactive nature of private enforcement, which seeks to redress harm after it has occurred. The deterrent effect which public enforcement has complements the recognition of the nature of markets as being a fundamental principle of distributive justice in a liberal society. 62 This latter point, as I have argued elsewhere, justifies the use of the criminal law to prevent this sort of market abuse, thus underscoring the legitimacy of the primacy of the public enforcement regime.
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Hence, if cartel activity is harmful, which it is almost unanimously believed to be, then the goal of an anti-cartel regime should be to prevent, by deterring this harm. In every respect this approach should mirror any regulation of activity which (if left un-or underregulated) could lead to harm: 64 it is preferable to prevent people from becoming victims than to allow them to become victims and provide a means to allow for their compensation afterwards. Accordingly, there are strong reasons to prefer public enforcement to trump private enforcement, in the event of a conflict. question is well beyond our present topic (but see Wardhaugh ibid). All which need be said at this juncture is that ex hypothesi anti-competitive harm through cartel activity is one such harm.
Addressing the above concerns in reverse order, I make the following suggestions.
First, the greatest weakness of ECJ's judgment in Pfleider is that judgment's treatment of the disclosure of documents created expressly for the purposes of the leniency applications. But for the application, these documents simply would not have existed. The Advocate-General correctly noted not only this point; but also noted that in creating such statements a leniency applicant would have a legitimate expectation of confidentiality (at least with regard to potential damage claimants) regarding their contents. Were such documents subject to disclosure, a leniency programme is less advantageous.
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Although in NGET Mr Justice Roth held that a leniency applicant had no legitimate expectation regarding the confidentiality of its application, I must disagree with this assertion.
The documents created for the purpose of such an application are highly self-incriminatory;
particularly given the need for the applicant's cooperation (and creation of further documents) to-in effect-decode other documents which describe the cartel's structure and operations. It is simply unlikely that such (potential) evidence would be created without an expectation of confidentiality-or at minimum, that it would not somehow enhance the applicant's exposure to damages. 
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Information which does not fit into the above exceptions may be disclosed at any time. Joint and several liability remains, however, the successful leniency applicant becomes the last target for recovery.
The Proposed Directive leans toward the American approach. However, notwithstanding the impracticalities of criminalisation, I suggest that any resolution to the difficulties raised by Pfleiderer be resolved in favour of public enforcement: a public regime acts as an ex ante deterrent, by preventing the activity in the first place. If cartel activity does inflict harm, prevention of harm-as opposed to compensating the harmed-appears to be the socially preferable strategy, and is a strategy which can be implemented on a case-by-case, document-by-document basis.
Conclusion
The ECJ's judgement in Pfleiderer and the proposed Directive which was published in response to it could-in several senses-be regarded as two steps forward and one step back in European cartel enforcement. The most significant advance made was the recognition of the importance of access to documents in civil actions. But the importance here is very double edged. While they are useful, indeed essential, to prospective Plaintiffs in their attempts to seek redress for the harms done to them, to Defendants their existence will aggravate their liability. And self-incriminating leniency applications will be the most useful (for Plaintiffs) and the most harmful (for Defendants) of this sort of documents. In the absence of European legislation on point, the ECJ had little choice to do what it did: in effect kicking the ball back to the Member States, leaving the situation-for both Plaintiffs and Defendants-unclear and unsatisfactory.
In this regard, the proposed Directive makes significant steps forward. It recognises the need to keep such disclosure applications confidential, to facilitate their production for the purposes of competition enforcement. In effect, the proposed Directive establishes a hierarchy which places public enforcement concerns over private enforcement concerns.
This, we argued, is as it should be: all other things being equal, harm prevention should be prioritised over compensation for harms. The proposed rules regarding confidentiality of such documents ensures that the balance is (or continues to be) tipped in favour of public enforcement.
But the proposed Directive's greatest failing is that it did not go far enough. The ensure that the applicant is made "no worse off" in any subsequent civil action by the application. While there is an argument that rewarding applicants and whistle-blowers by providing with some advantage vis-à-vis their co-conspirators further enhances cartel instability 81 this may go too far. Rewarding a "guilty party" may appear distasteful in some European legal cultures, some of which may frown on plea-bargains, settlements, and bounties. However, mandating that the applicant is no worse off as a result of the application should have been a priority for those drafting the proposed Directive. Such a statement would have enhanced the efficacy of leniency programmes and public enforcement by giving prospective applicants the assurance they need.
Expanding on this point, while leniency documents and their production may be one instance of a conflict between the public and private enforcement regimes, it need not be the only such conflict. A more forceful and more general rule for the resolution of such conflicts in favour of public enforcement would prevent repetition of the scenario which developed in
Pfleiderer. That is, a conflict between the public and private regime develops, the absence of EU law on point requires the ECJ to mandate the resolution to the conflict by national law, but given the multiplicity of national laws, no clear or predictable result is apparent to the Court. EU legislation is needed, and a somewhat narrow piece of legislation is developed some years later. This proposed Directive, had it been a more sweeping response could possibly have eliminated such a future need. If so, this was an opportunity lost.
